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It is a great pleasure to reply to the insightful remarks of my colleagues, who raise a 
number of very important and challenging issues, and I hope I can do justice to them 
and at the same time clarify some of the controversial aspects of my book. As some 
of the remarks are shared, I have taken the liberty of addressing them where I see fit 
and avoided a repetition of the replies. 
 
1. THERESE SCARPELLI CORY 
 
Through the intervention of Cory’s comments, I hope to distance myself from some 
of the unsavory implications of my position. After all, I have nothing against the 
vetula in her quest to become deiform and achieve perfect union with God. 
I should then begin with the appearance of elitism in my rendition Islamic 
Peripateticism. Cory writes:  
 
Certainly the philosopher works hard to cultivate virtue, since that is the only 
way to gain the immortal “acquired intellect.”  But what about the little old lady 
who is equally assiduous in cultivating virtue?  Through no fault of her own, 
according to the Islamic Peripatetic model, she is denied perfect union with God 
in this life, and loses the opportunity for immortality. [See 26-27 of the current 
issue.]
1
  
 
There is elitism, if the philosopher is committed to the view that people are, for the 
most part, essentially deprived of the capacity for salvation, and that salvation is 
dependent on this distinction in the essence of human beings. Now it may be that due 
to the difficulty in the process of attaining philosophical excellence, few people do 
actually attain it; but that to me is not elitism per se. There is a further issue, which is 
also pointed out by Cory, that philosophical cultivation presupposes a certain amount 
of leisure and education, which may not be available to everyone. In other words, are 
                                                 
1
 The page numbers of the critics’ citation references in the current issue are given in bracket 
parentheses. 
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philosophy and religion two different projects that channel salvation for two 
contingently different kinds of people, the elite and the commoner, respectively? Is 
that not a milder but no less problematic form of elitism?  
Let me begin by saying that Islamic Peripatetics, as I understand them, by virtue 
of subscribing to the idea of religion as revealed to the philosopher-prophet-king, are 
not committed to a separation between religion and philosophy, in that way. The 
religious law and practices provide the starting point of a training that culminates in 
the perfection of the intellect, which is itself a spiritual faculty and of central 
importance for revealed religions. Without the preparation provided by the law and 
practices prescribed by religion, philosophical training proper cannot begin. Now in 
the Avicennan version of this view of religion, I maintain, the cultivation of 
imagination can itself culminate in a conjunction with the Active Intellect. This is 
possible, as I explain in more detail in my reply to Pessin, in virtue of the training of 
our feelings of pleasure and astonishment through the experience of the great work of 
art. 
So the vetula, in this alternative view, will have to begin with submission to law 
and commitment to the practices prescribed by the revealed religion. Then she can 
engage in either the aesthetic training provided by the scriptural art or proceed with 
philosophical training. Either way, she has to dedicate herself to the project of self-
transformation, and her success is the measure of her commitment to that process. I 
should also add that the philosophers and the poets-in-training are restless souls vying 
for the intensification of the intimacy that is available in varying degrees to the 
"faithful" in the various stages of initiation. 
Cory also takes issue with my claim that Thomas Aquinas’ interiorization of the 
Active Intellect is a source of the divide between religion and philosophy or faith and 
reason, a separation that characterizes much of subsequent philosophy. She asks:  “I 
wonder, then, if Azadpur’s objection is really directed, not at immanentized 
psychologies, but at abstractionist theories of cognition. In other words, perhaps the 
objection ought to run something like this: If intelligibles are cognized only by 
abstracting them from extramental sensible objects (rather than by receiving them 
directly from a separate Agent Intellect), then the human intellect seems to be 
restricted to this-worldly, empirical objects.” [24] I am not sure that the abstractionist 
view can be problematized in this way, and Cory herself offers attractive responses to 
such a critique of abstractionism any way. In my view, the problem stems from the 
characterization of the spiritual as extra-intellectual and once you combine that with 
abstractionism, then all intelligibles are restricted to the material world and cognitive 
access to the spiritual realm is ruled out. I would add that this is probably not a 
charitable construal of Thomas’s view, but one could probably find versions of it in 
of the work later (especially modern) philosophers who appropriate the faith and 
reason divide to which Thomas did contribute. Finally, the internalization of the 
Active Intellect obscures the incentive for moral and epistemic progress that I discuss 
in my reply to El-Bizri’s critique of the Peripatetic notion of the Active Intellect. 
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2. NADER EL-BIZRI 
 
I remember reading El-Bizri’s book, The Phenomenological Quest: Between 
Avicenna and Heidegger, with fondness as I was putting the final touches on my 
book. It certainly illuminated aspects of my project, but it was too late for me to 
respond to it in a very substantial way. So I was looking forward to El-Bizri’s 
comments so as to discuss more extensively some of the issues regarding our 
engagements of similar figures and topics. 
I believe that El-Bizri’s critical remarks can be summed up by saying that I did 
not quite succeed in showing the modern relevance of Islamic Peripateticism. He 
says: 
 
Having said that, one ought to indeed reflect on the phenomenon of the spiritual 
incapacitation of philosophy (108); albeit, this can be done by accentuating the 
primacy of ethics over ontology, over cosmology and epistemology, without 
retaining nostalgic poetizing imagery or reactionary relativistic commitments to 
Peripatetic or Neo-Platonist pictures that are no longer sustainable in our epoch. 
[33] 
 
El-Bizri’s lingering doubts about the relevance of the Peripatetic moves for modern 
thought are especially poignant as I repeatedly claim and argue that such moves are 
indeed relevant, if not necessary (in a prescriptive sense). So, perhaps I need to say 
some more about this. 
El-Bizri finds something unique and positive in the way modernity is as an epoch 
and the vantage point shared by modern philosophers. For him, there is something at 
work in modernity (what El-Bizri calls “the age of modern techno- 
science,” [29, 33, 34]) perhaps in the advances that science has made and technology 
has appropriated, that is fresh, novel, and revelatory. And the profound thinkers of the 
modern epoch, and surely Heidegger is among them, have done much to curtail pre-
modernity’s metaphysical (and poetic) excesses and have gone a long way toward 
establishing a demystified view of human beings and their world (while maintaining 
as much of the earlier tradition’s relevant insights). For El-Bizri, the claim that ethics 
is “a prolegomenon to philosophical thinking” [31] is the only valuable contribution 
of my work to the study of Islamic Peripateticism.  
A main task of Reason Unbound has been to offer a more general (than a mere 
ethical) anti-dote to modernism – the thesis that modernity involves a radical (and 
progressive) departure from the past and requires a new philosophy. Now short of 
reciting the arguments of the book all over again, I say that my dismantling of 
modernism begins with a serious consideration of the primacy of ethics. Such a 
starting point goes a long way in taking down a fundamental dualism definitive of 
modernism: the divide between mind and world. Ethical training involves the 
cultivation of a kind of sensitivity to the moral requirements embodied in particular 
circumstances, and once we are able to follow through this starting point, the notion 
of a purely causal world that is denuded of values and concepts begins to lose its grip 
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on us. The purely causal world is the modernist’s demystified world and its vanishing 
grip is a main outcome of the ethical preparation. There are at least two further related 
points that I make in my book: 1) The ethically initiated erosion of the mind-world 
dualism entails that the mind reaches all the way down, but not at the expense of 
exposing us to a supernatural Platonism
2
 or a mere “congruence of subjectivities.”3  
Instead, the concepts, that is, the abilities to cognize intelligibles, are drawn in 
passively in our experience of the world and actively in our judgments about it. 
Knowledge, that is, our judgments getting things right, is preserved, while affirming 
our involvement in making “things” show themselves. 2) Freedom from the grip of 
problematic theses that preserve the mind-world dualism is not a merely intellectual 
matter. I believe this is a point that that chafes Ei-Bizri’s modernist sensibility and 
compels him to call my work preparatory. [35] Of course, one is not going to whisk 
oneself away from the bewildering web of reflective and pre-reflective perplexities 
(including modernism) by simply reading a book; that is not how philosophy as a way 
of life works. My book, as an instrument in the repertoire of the transformative 
approach to philosophy, is designed to effect a disturbance (especially in one who is 
in the grip of the modernist sensibility); as such, Reason Unbound is indeed 
preparatory and may result in the practice of the philosophical cultivation necessary 
for genuine liberation and authenticity. 
In the end, I would like to address El-Bizri’s critique of the relevance of the 
Islamic Peripatetic notion of a separate Active Intelligence. He finds it a mythical 
remnant of a bygone age: 
 
One can still evoke the significance of virtue-ethics and stress its primacy in 
preceding intellectual inquiry (104) or scientific research. This aim does not 
anymore require the continuation hitherto of conversations about an Active 
Intellect within our contemporary intellectual settings. It is not also a well-
founded critique to level against Heidegger that he was reductive in his approach 
by doing away with the notion of a separate intelligence, and by following the 
footsteps of his predecessors that went down the route of Thomism (pp. 105-
107). Heidegger’s thought unfurled against the background of his preoccupation 
with the question of the meaning, truth, and place of being in a scientific age that 
is marked by the unfolding of the essence of modern technology. [33] 
 
In my book, I devote a considerable effort to discussing the Peripatetic notion of a 
transcendent Active Intellect. The Active Intellect is the actualized intellect, that is, 
the intellect that has become all things and has the intelligibles within. The Peripatetic 
opponents of a transcendent Active Intellect assign its function to the human intellect. 
                                                 
2
 In Mind and World, John McDowell refers to this position as “rampant Platonism” as the view that 
the mind apprehends a super-human meaning (1994, 77). This is the more general account of the same 
Platonism that he criticizes earlier (in the context of a metaethical discussion) as the consoling myth of 
rules as rails (1981, 149). This is not an outright rejection of Platonism, as McDowell also labels his 
own position as a kind of Platonism (1981, 156. See also 1994, 92).  
3
 This is Stanley Cavell’s phrase as quoted by McDowell (1981, 149). I mean to emphasize the 
criticism offered by McDowell of Cavell’s view as still in the grip of the mind-world dualism. 
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But then it is difficult to explain how the same intellect can be actual and potential 
simultaneously. I recognize that the dispute about the transcendence of the Active 
Intellect is almost as old as Aristotelianism itself, and my aim is not to get bogged 
down in the dialectical exchanges between the proponents and the opponents of this 
notion. Instead, I argue that the proponents of a transcendent Active Intellect succeed 
better in reconciling faith and reason, philosophy and revealed religion. And of 
course, one problematic feature of modernism is its feebleness in negotiating a 
satisfactory resolution of these dualisms, and one of the factors contributing to this 
infirmity is the apparent unpalatability of a transcendent Active Intellect. For my 
Peripatetics, religious expressions are symbolic manifestations of what philosophical 
thought aims to uncover intellectually, and a transcendent Active Intellect, for these 
philosophers, is not a consolation from getting things right. It brings to view the 
difficulty of a transparent awareness, which is the elusive reward (vis-à-vis a 
conjunction with the Active Intellect) of the humble and virtuous knowledge seekers. 
Moreover, the invocation of the transcendent Active Intellect and the aspiration to 
conjoin with it are incentives for further ethical and epistemic progress. Latin anti-
Averroists found in this view a challenge to the authority of the church and sought to 
discredit it. Subsequently, even when the church’s condemnation lost its grip on 
educational institutions, mainstream philosophy was not able to shake off the 
spiritually inert role assigned to it in medieval universities.  
 
3.  BO MOU 
 
Mou gets to the point right away by putting forth a familiar account of philosophical 
inquiry and contends that it is more general than the ones I put forth in my book. He 
has in mind my appropriation of the competing views of the philosophical inquiry 
that Pierre Hadot, in his now famous Philosophy as a Way Life, pits against one 
another. For Hadot, mainstream historians of philosophy, when they come to ancient 
philosophy, take it to be in the business of producing philosophical discourse. This he 
takes to be at odds with the project that the ancients themselves undertook and called 
philosophy. For them philosophy was primarily the practice of spiritual exercises 
aimed at the transformation of the self and the acquisition of wisdom.
 4
  Now a central 
claim made in my book is that Hadot’s reading of ancient philosophy is the 
conception of philosophy Muslims inherit from the Greeks. Mou, however, maintains 
that “[m]any think that the critique (taking nothing absolutely immune from criticism 
and without blindly claiming anything) and justification (understood in a broad way) 
constitute two closely-related (prescriptive) defining features of philosophical 
inquiries”. [37] Given this broader conception of philosophical inquiry, Mou 
comments that “[a]ctually, both the production of the abstract rational theory account 
and the practice of spiritual exercises can go in distinct directions: either in the 
critical/justification direction or in the faith-based divinely direction.” [37]  
                                                 
4
 Hadot 1995, 269. 
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This is an interesting distinction, but I would like to suggest that it is itself an item 
in the modernist’s repertoire. To be more precise, this distinction can be seen as a 
reformulation of the modernist contrast between faith and reason or religion and 
philosophy. In this light, I do have something to say about that account. Islamic 
Peripatetics did not see a fundamental difference between the purpose of religious 
practice and that of philosophy. For them, both aimed at the attainment of truth 
(ḥaqīqa). In fact, they maintained that philosophy itself ought to belong to the core of 
religion’s transformative technologies, and religious symbolism and practices ought 
to contribute to the initiation of the person into the philosophical way of life. Indeed, 
in this picture, religion is not in the business of articulating systems of dogma, which 
one believes blindly (has faith in). Rather, “faith,” as Karen Armstrong has pointed 
out, is rather to “give yourself” or “commit yourself” to (or “engage”) the way of life 
symbolized by the belief. In her essay, “Faith and Modernity,” she writes that “the 
Latin word credo (translated now as “I believe”) seems to have derived from the 
phrase cor dare: to give one’s heart. The Middle English word beleven meant to love. 
When Christians proclaimed: credo in unum Deum, they were not so much affirming 
their belief in the existence of a single deity as committing their lives to God.”5  I 
would add that in this approach, God is the real as such, and a commitment to God 
means the embracing of the way of truth, i.e., the practice of getting reality right. It is 
by the engagement in the purifying spiritual practices that we become like that which 
we seek to know, and it is only thus that we can know it. The dogmatic approach to 
faith, on the other hand, is on par with the approach to philosophy that aims at the 
mere production of rational discourse, they both miss the alchemical dimension of 
philosophy and religion, that is, the transformation of the self to the point of 
achieving intimacy with the divine. 
Having said this, I would like to respond to another of Mou’s questions. He asks, 
“given that Islamic Peripatetic tradition includes the prophecy discourse as its crucial 
portion, how can one look at the due relationship between the critique/justification 
character of philosophical activities and the imagination power of prophecy? Should 
such imagination be regulated by adequate critique/justification or eventually be 
based on religious faith in God (in the Islamic sense of the term)?” [38] Yes, 
prophecy and philosophy are different sides of the same coin, and the test of prophecy 
is in its philosophical coherence. Of course, we should understand by “philosophy” 
the practices of self-transformation for the sake of wisdom and by “prophecy” more 
than the foreshadowing of future events. In my book, I spend a lot of time working 
out the notion of prophecy as developed by Islamic Peripatetics. The lowest form of 
prophecy is the anticipation of future events, and at its apex, it is the direct grasp of 
the intelligibles. I should add that in the Peripatetic prophetic philosophy, the venues 
of divine mercy are not limited and wisdom and its relevant practices are available 
throughout history and across geographical boundaries.
6
 There are some Islamic 
traditions that claim a more direct path, but the Peripatetic paths to truth are as 
                                                 
5
 Armstrong 2004, 73. 
6
 See my brief treatment of Hegel’s philosophical chauvinism in Azadpur 2011, 73-4.  
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multifarious as that allowed by the limits of human ingenuity and inspiration in the 
quest for the Good. 
A third point raised by Mou concerns the non-Peripatetic forms of Islamic 
philosophy. He asks whether they all forms of Islamic philosophy by the conception 
of philosophy as a way of life. [39-40] I answer in the affirmative. Alternative forms 
of Islamic philosophy, like those more heavily Platonist, Plotinian, skeptical, etc., 
also operate within the framework of philosophy as a practice of spiritual exercises 
for the sake of virtue and wisdom. This is in agreement with what Seyyed Hossein 
Nasr writes, rather eloquently and concisely, as a way of characterizing all species of 
Islamic philosophy: “This conception of philosophy as dealing with the discovering 
of the truth concerning the nature of things and combining mental knowledge with the 
purification and perfection of one's being has lasted to this day wherever the tradition 
of Islamic philosophy has continued and is in fact embodied in the very being of the 
most eminent representatives of the Islamic philosophical tradition.”7 Different 
schools of philosophy in the Islamic tradition realize this conception differently. In 
my book, for instance, I draw upon Abu  H āmid Muh  ammad al-Ghazzālī’s position to 
highlight a form of “Islamic philosophy” that stems from ancient skepticism and is 
critical of the Peripatetic approach. 
 
4. SARAH PESSIN 
 
I sympathize with Pessin’s anxieties in trying to represent a philosophical tradition 
that is relegated to the margins of mainstream philosophy and holds a key to 
dissolving some of its most perplexing problems. My sympathy is multiplied by the 
historical connections and shared commitments of Medieval Islamic and Jewish 
thinkers. My excursion into Thomas' explicit disavowals of the views of Islamic 
thinkers stems from my attempt to diagnose a source of the misreadings that affects 
not only the Western reception of Islamic philosophy (and medieval Jewish 
philosophy, for that matter) but also the contours of the ensuing philosophical 
enterprise. I do not want to put the entire weight of such misreadings on Thomas; his 
critique of Avicenna's theory of the Active Intellect is not the only source; another 
salient wellspring of the aberrations in the subsequent tradition of Western 
philosophy is the rise of ethical voluntarism in late thirteenth century, and here 
Thomas' own views are themselves challenged and marginalized.
8
  These are just two 
of the more explicit sources of opposition to the tradition of Islamic Peripateticism. I 
do not deny that there are other more subtle (and perhaps more pernicious) ones, and 
I'd be happy to learn more from Pessin. 
Pessin asks “why invoke Heidegger in this project at all?” [43] I understand her 
concerns about Heidegger. In a context, where "introducing" the Islamic Peripatetics 
is the order of the day, why should they be related to a philosopher whose atrocious 
conduct is well-documented and nothing short of appalling? Having said that, I 
                                                 
7
 Nasr 1996, 24–25. 
8
 See Kent 1995, especially 40-6. 
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should now emphasize that I engage Heidegger for three main reasons. First, I draw 
extensively on Henry Corbin's reading of Islamic Peripatetics, and Corbin's position 
is rooted in early Heidegger. Second, Early Heidegger is immersed in scholastic 
Aristotelianism and draws heavily from it in his phenomenology. His aim is to avoid 
the institutionalization of Aristotle-interpretation, and that comes at the cost of 
obscuring the Aristotelian origins of his view. Thirdly, Heidegger-interpretation is the 
site of a fascinating exchange between John McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus, where 
McDowell brings to light Dreyfus' commitment to a problematic view of the relation 
between mind and world. I especially wanted to seize that opportunity to point to 
some of the problematic aspects of the contemporary theories of mind, especially 
since I found those aspects insidiously at work in missing the point of the approach to 
philosophy as a practice of spiritual exercises. Having said that, I took every 
opportunity to point out the unsavory figure of Heidegger and the relation of his 
philosophy to his appalling choices. 
Having responded to Pessin's initial worry, I want to turn to the core of her 
concerns about the various senses of "spiritual practice" in my work. She asks first 
"whether the initial training or the resulting phronesis is more properly illustrative of 
the ‘spiritual practice’ that he has in mind when he emphasizes that Islamic 
rationalism is itself deeply tied up with spiritual practice.” [44] For me, spiritual 
practices are only instrumental. So the initial ethical training is obviously "spiritual 
practice" in the sense that I mean it. It aims at phronesis or practical wisdom. Now, 
phronesis, to put it in a nutshell, is the ability to recognize the good in a particular 
situation and to be able to respond to its requirements swiftly. As such, it is itself the 
beginning of the process that culminates in the acquired intellect, i.e., the intellect 
which grasps the secondary intelligibles (including but clearly going beyond the 
moral intelligibles – e.g., the good) immediately. So the practice of phronesis is at the 
service of a higher good, and a spiritual practice. 
Pessin, then, wonders that if "the source of the ethical training is itself a divinely 
revealed Islamic Law, does that not put a kind of Divine Command Theory at the 
foundation – and does such a foundation not risk overshadowing the fluidity of 
Aristotelian phronesis with a more rigid mode of 'following God’s law'?" [44] This is 
also a very important question. Islamic Peripatetics attribute the legislative act of the 
prophet-philosopher to his perfected imagination, and such an imagination enables 
him to provide a set of laws that are easy to understand and persuasive so that the 
initiate can begin the process of self-overcoming. The practices get intensified at the 
level of supererogatory ascetic exercises and result in the transparent awareness of the 
good that marks the stage of phronesis. The process goes even further as the 
theoretical intellect is cultivated. Therefore, the Divine Law, for the Islamic 
Peripatetics, is only the lowest rung of the practices that culminate in wisdom. 
Nevertheless, it is an essential part of the process of sapiential development. 
In response to Pessin’s questions about my contributions to the understanding of 
poetic interpretation (ta’wi  l), [45-6] I should begin by emphasizing that, with 
Avicenna, Islamic Peripateticism comes to acquire a further engagement of the 
faculty of imagination in the advanced stages of the philosophical development, i.e., 
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beyond practical wisdom. The earlier engagement concerns the divine law. In the 
later forms of this engagement, the person may take on the symbolic aspect of sacred 
text and cultivate his feelings of pleasure and awe by interpreting (ta’wi  l) the relevant 
presentations of the Good in the text (work of art). As I argue in my book, in his 
Poetics, Avicenna contrasts this aesthetic refinement with the refinement of the 
theoretical intellect by the philosopher, and maintains that the former can also bring 
the person to the brinks of divine inspiration.
9
 This is the start of the obsession with 
the imaginal in the subsequent Islamic philosophers. Also this is where I place 
Corbin's concern with the symbolic rather than the allegorical approach to Avicenna's 
own efforts at poetic production. As Corbin rightly points out, drawing on a 
distinction indigenous to Romantic poetics, Avicenna's poetic treatises are not 
allegories, that is they are not publicly available representations of a point that is 
otherwise accessible more precisely and directly to the elite philosopher in his 
intellectual quest. Rather, the symbols are hierophanies, and their exegesis (ta’wi l) 
refines his inner life and enables him to become deiform (i.e., attain theosis or 
ta’alluh).10 
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